Wired has a fascinating story this week, about the length Sophos has gone to for the last 5 years, to track down a group of malicious but clever security researchers that were continually discovering vulnerabilities and then using those findings to attack real-world targets. Sophos believes this adversary to be overlapping Chinese groups known as APT31, APT41, and Volt Typhoon.
The story is actually refreshing in its honesty, with Sophos freely admitting that their products, and security products from multiple other vendors have been caught in the crosshairs of these attacks. And indeed, we’ve covered stories about these vulnerabilities over the past weeks and months right here on this column. The sneaky truth is that many of these security products actually have pretty severe security problems.
The issues at Sophos started with an infection of an informational computer at a subsidiary office. They believe this was an information gathering exercise, that was a precursor to the widespread campaign. That campaign used multiple 0-days to crack “tens of thousands of firewalls around the world”. Sophos rolled out fixes for those 0-days, and included just a bit of extra logging as an undocumented feature. That logging paid off, as Sophos’ team of researchers soon identified an early signal among the telemetry. This wasn’t merely the first device to be attacked, but was actually a test device used to develop the attack. The game was on.
Sophos managed to deploy it’s own spyware to these test devices, to stealthily keep an eye on this clever opponent. This even thwarted a later attack before it could really start. Among the interesting observations was a bootkit infection on one of these firewalls. This wasn’t ever found in the wild, but the very nature of such an attack makes it hard to discover.
There’s one more interesting wrinkle to this story. In at least one case, Sophos received the 0-day vulnerability used in an attack through their bug bounty program, right after the wave of attacks was launched. The timing, combined with the Chinese IP Address makes it pretty clear this was more than a coincidence. This might be a Chinese hacker making a bit of extra cash on the side. It’s also reminiscent of the Chinese law requiring companies to disclose vulnerabilities to the Chinese government.
PTA 0-Day
GreyNoise runs a honeypot and an AI threat detection system, and found something interesting with that combination. The PTZOptics network security camera was the intended target, and there were a pair of vulnerabilities that this attack was intended to exploit. The first is a simple authorization bypass, where sending HTTP packets without an authorization header to the param.cgi endpoint returns data without any authorization needed. Use the get_system_conf parameter, and the system helpfully prints out valid username and password hashes. How convenient.
Gaining arbitrary command execution is trivial, as the ntp configuration isn’t properly sanitized, and the ntp binary is called insecurely. A simple $(cmd) can be injected for easy execution. Those two were being chained together for a dead simple attack chain, presumably to add the IoT devices to a botnet. The flaws have been fixed, and law enforcement have been on the case, at least seizing the IP address observed in the attacks.
Speaking of camera hacks, we do have an impressive tale from Pwn2Own 2024, where researchers at Synacktiv used a format string vulnerability to pwn the Synology TC500 camera. The firmware in question had a whole alphabet of security features, like ASLR, PIE, NX, and Full RelRO. That’s Address Space Layout Randomization, Position Independent Executables, Non-Executable memory, and Full Relocation Read-Only protections. Oh, and the payload was limited to 128 characters, with the first 32 ASCII characters unavailable for use.
How exactly does one write an exploit in this case? A bit of a lucky break with the existing memory layout gave access to what the write-up calls a “looping pointer”. That seems to be a pointer that points to itself, which is quite useful to work from offsets instead of precise memory locations. The vulnerability allowed for writing a shell command into unused memory. Then finally a bit of Return Oriented Programming, a ROP gadget, manages to launch a system call on the saved command line. Impressive.
Maybe It Wasn’t a Great Idea
…to give LLMs code execution capabilities. That’s the conclusion we came to after reading CyberArk’s post on how to achieve Remote Code Execution on a Large Language Model. The trick here is that this particular example, LoLLMs, can run python code on the backend to perform certain tasks, like do math calculations. This implementation uses Python sandboxing, and naturally there’s a known way to defeat it. The trick can be pulled off just by getting the model to evaluate the right JSON snippet, but it’s smart enough to realize that something is off and refuse to evaluate the JSON.
The interesting detail here is that it is the LLM itself that is refusing, so it’s the LLM that needs bypassed. There has been very interesting work done on LLM jailbreaks, like DAN, the Do Anything Now prompt. That would probably have worked, but this exploit can be even sneakier than that. Simply ask the LLM to help you write some JSON. Specify the payload, and ask it to add something to it. It gladly complies, and code is executed. Who knew that LLMs were so gullible?
More Quantum Erratta
This story just keeps on giving. This time it’s [Dan Goodin] at Ars Technica that has the lowdown, filling in the last few missing details about the much over-hyped quantum computing breakthrough. One of the first of those details is that the story of the compromise of AES was published in the South China Morning Post, which has over-hyped Chinese quantum progress before. What [Goodin]’s article really adds to the discussion is opinions from experts. The important takeaway is that the performance of the D-Wave quantum computer is comparable to classical approaches.
Bits and Bytes
Remember the traffic light hacking? And part two? We now have the third installment, which is really all about you, too, can purchase and hack on one of these traffic controllers. It may or may not surprise you that the answer is to buy them on Ebay and cobble together a makeshift power supply.
It’s amazing how often printers, point of sale, and other IoT gadgets are just running stripped-down, ancient versions of Android. This point of sale system is no exception, running an old, custom Android 6 system, that seems to actually be rather well locked down. Except that it has an NFC reader, and you can program NFC tags to launch Android apps. Use this creative workaround to get into Android settings, and you’re in business.
I have long maintained that printers are terrible. That sentiment apparently is extending into security research on printers, with Lexmark moving to a new encrypted filesystem for printer firmware. Thankfully, like most of these schemes, it’s not foolproof, and [Peter] has the scoop on getting in. May you never need it. Because seriously, printers are the worst.
This articles is written by : Nermeen Nabil Khear Abdelmalak
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By Nermeen Nabil Khear 
